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I. THE INDUSTRIAL SITUATION
Although North and South Carolina are traditionally and funda-
mentally agricultural states, the days have passed in which King
Cotton's title was undisputed and each southern plantation was an
economic entity, which was to a large extent self sustaining. The
use of modern machinery, the division of labor, and the development
of the factory with the consequent factory village, is fast working a
transformation in the old order of things. Capitalists are more and
more securing Carolina mill sites in order to have the close prox-
imity to forests, water power, cotton fields, and a native population
untainted by what they consider "radical proclivities." Until today,
in addition to the claim to preeminence as cotton producing states,
the Carolinas are fast becoming one of the important industrial
units in the country, and it is believed that their future is assured.
In 1920 the total population in North Carolina was 2,559,123
and of this number, 895,852 or 35 per cent were engaged in gainful
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occupations.1 Of the number engaged in gainful occupations, 477,-
686 or 53 per cent were engaged in agriculture, forestry, and animal
husbandry, while 258,314 or 28 per cent were engaged in extraction
of minerals, manufacturing and mechanical industries, transportation
and public service.2 According to the 14th census of the United
States, of the 48 states, North Carolina ranked 14th in population,
28th in area, 18th in density of population, 13th in the number of
wage earners employed in manufacturing establishments, 17th ac-
cording to the cost of raw materials used in its manufacturing estab-
lishments, 15th according to the value of its manufacturing products,
and 13th according to the value added by the manufacturing process.3
In 1920 the total population of South Carolina was 1,683,724
and of this number 674,257 or 40 per cent were engaged in gainful
occupations. 4 Of the number engaged in gainful occupations 420,-
635 or 62 per cent were engaged in agriculture, forestry, and animal
husbandry. According to the 14th census, of the 48 states, South
Carolina ranked 26th in population, 39th in area, 17th in density of
population, 28th in the number of wage earners employed in manu-
facturing establishments, 32nd according to the cost of the raw mate-
rials used in its manufacturing establishments, 32nd according to the
value of its manufacturing products, and 31st according to the value
added by the manufacturing process.5
Massachusetts manufactures more cotton goods than any other
state, being followed by North and South Carolina. These three
states produce more than one-half of the cotton goods manufactured
in this country. In 1919 there were 311 cotton mills in North Caro-
lina, and the average number of wage earners employed in these
mills was 67,297; while there were 145 mills in South Carolina
employing 48,079. Of these establishments in the two states, 98
employed less than 100 wage earners in North Carolina while only
19 employed less than 100 in South Carolina; 154 employed from
101 to 250 in North Carolina while in South Carolina, 56 employed
from 101 to 250 wage earners; 33 employed from 251 to 500 in
North Carolina while in South Carolina, 37 employed from 251 to
500 wage earners; 21 employed from 501 to 1000 in North Carolina
'Abstract 14th Census, p. 497.
'Abstract 14th Census, p. 500.
SAbstract 14th Census, p. 920.
" 14th Census, Population, Vol. 4, p. 44.
'14th Census, Manufactures, Vol. 8, p. 18, Table 10.
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while in South Carolina, 28 employed from 501 to 1000; 5 employed
more than 1000 in North Carolina while in South Carolina, 5 also
employed over 1000 wage earners. In 1923 there were in North
Carolina 2,670 manufacturing establishments employing 173,687
wage earners and turning out products to the value of $951,910,599;
while in South Carolina there were in 1923, 1,180 manufacturing
establishments employing 96,802 wage earners turning out products
to the value of $360,445,737.
The following table shows the distribution of wage earners in
the manufacturing industries located in North and South Carolina:
CENSUS OF MANUFACTURES, 1923
SUMMARY FOR MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES IN NORTH AND SOUTH
CAROLINA FOR THE YEAR 1923.
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, WASHINGTON.
NORTH CAROLINA SOUTH CAROLINA
Number Wage Number Wage
INDUSTRY of Earners Per of Earners Per
Establih- (Average Cent Establish- (Average Cent
ments Number) ments Number)
All Industries ............... 2,670 173,687 ...... 1,180 96,802 .....
Cotton goods .... .......... 351 81,041 46t6 152 62,479 64.4
Lumber and timber .......... 587 19,960 11.6 308 17,307 17.8
Fertilizers .................. 64 1,721 .9 48 1,547 1.5
Planing mill products ........ 125 2,985 1.6 39 1,160 1.1
Oil, cake and meal ........... 52 1,226 .6 46 827 .8
Clay products ............... 67 1,892 1.0 22 673 .6
Knit goods ................. 109 12,351 7.0
Tobacco .................... 26 13,959 7.9
Furniture ................... 113 10,624 6.1
Allother industries .......... 1,176 27,928 15.7 565 12,809 12.7
In addition to the wage earners in the manufacturing industries,
in 1920 there were 47,292 persons engaged in various transportation
industries, extracting minerals, and public service in North Carolina;
while in South Carolina, there were 22,092 engaged in the same in-
dustries.6 Thus there were 258,314 wage earners alone who could
possibly get the benefit of a Workmen's Compensation Act in North
Carolina; while in South Carolina, there would be probably 125,000.
However, for one reason or another, part of this number would be
excluded. For example, the federal statutes govern cages of railway,
14th Census, Population, Vol. 4, p. 1014, et seq.
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employees injured while engaged in inter-state commerce, and com-
pensation acts are usually not compulsory as to employers employing
less than 6 employees. But the number of those excluded would not
be as numerous as one might expect. In 1919, only 5.3 per cent 7
of the total wage earners employed in manufacturing' industries in
North Carolina were employed by concerns employing less than 6
wage earners, while in South Carolina it was 2.8 per cent. It should
also be remembered that the figures mentioned were compiled in
1923 and since that time, there has been a considerable increase in
the number of employees engaged in these industries. It therefore
seems clear that 250,000 is a conservative estimate for North Caro-
lina and 125,000 for South Carolina. This makes a total of 375,000
wage earners who would be benefitted by a Workmen's Compensation
Act, which is anything near as broad as it should be.
Broadus Mitchell, a member of the Department of Political
Economy in Johns Hopkins University, writing in the Yale Review
for April, 1925, said:
"In the making of competitive cloths the New England mill is
doomed. The southern manufacturer employs a comparative ad-
vantage that averages about 30 per cent. The New England mill in
competition with the Southern mill is 'Marginal'--that is, is must be
content with a smaller profit in good times, and must reduce oper-
ations or close down altogether when depression overtakes the indus-
try. There are agents and superintendents in the non-cotton grow-
ing states who stupidly shut their eyes to the facts. There are others
who, with sufficient dread of the real situation, keep up an optimism
by relying upon the well established character of their manufacture
and by reminding themselves of the traditional ingenuity of the
Yankee in cutting comers. Still others, with disappearing profits
in the last two years, have pressed their labor harder, only to find
the workmen rebelling. Finally, there is the large number of manu-
facturers, many of them presiding over the oldest and greatest estab-
lishments north of Mason and Dixon's line, who acknowledge defeat
in the north and seek salvation by moving south.
"In the last eleven months of 1923, a New England authority
estimates, the spindles in place in the south increased by 518,000,
while in the non-cotton growing states they decreased by 107,000.
Massachusetts alone lost 35,000 spindles. The tide has turned. The
old attitude towards the south has changed. It is not pretended that
many New England manufactories will move south. Geographically,
shifts in a great industry come less obviously, but no less certain.
What happens is that a Lowell or Lawrence company in contem-
plating extensions, looks only to the south, or a visitor goes down
'Abstract 14th Census, p. 1000.
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an impressive alley of mills lining a century-old canal; though yard
men are about, and here and there a building vibrates with machinery
the leaves that have fallen from the elms and litter the vacant street
seem somehow symbolic. Cloth that cost 34 cents per pound to
manufacture here, cost the same company in its southern factory,
only 22 cents. One mill makes as much as the other loses, and so
the disadvantaged New England establishment continues to live on
sufferance. But further along one comes to a great structure that is
utterly silent. This plant has earned its capitalization several times
over in better years, and now will never open as a cotton mill again."
It is freely admitted that the 375,000 employees who will come
within the provisions of Compensation Acts in North and South
Carolina are a relatively small number when compared with the total
number of workers in the manufacturing centers of the nation. But
it is too large a group to leave unprotected when measured in terms
of human life and economic welfare, and as has been previously
shown, the reasons for expecting a continued increase in this number
are substantial. The states are under a positive duty to see to it
that hard working citizens or their dependent families are promptly
compensated, when the inevitable casualties of industry deprive them
of life or impair their efficiency as productive units.
II. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS
It is not commonly realized how many workers are killed or
maimed as a result of modern industrial conditions. Notwithstand-
ing important precautions taken to safeguard workers, especially in
states having compensation laws, there seems to be little if any abate-
ment in the number of accidents that occur annually.
Dr. E. H. Downey,8 late Compensation Actuary of the Insurance
Department of Pennsylvania, describes the situation as follows:
"The machine technology *which more and more prevails in the
modern industry makes use of stupendous forces-steam, electricity,
explosives, chemical reagents-forces that multiply human power a
thousand fold while kept in leash, but are equally potent for destruc-
tion when out of command. .
"Safely to perform their work, the operatives of a modern mill,
mine, or railway, should think consistently in those mechanical terms
in which the industrial process runs. They should respond auto-
matically to most varied mechanical exigencies and should be as in-
sensible to fatigue and as invariable in behavior as the machines they
operate. Human nature, inherited from uncounted generations that
knew not the machine, does not possess these attributes in anything
'Downey, (1924) Workmen's Compensation, 6.
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like the requisite degree. The common man is neither an automaton
nor an animated slide rule. . . . All of which comes to saying
that the human organism is imperfectly adapted to a mechanical en-
vironment. The requisite adjustment is not likely soon to be attained,
because the mechanization of industry proceeds faster than the pro-
cesses of habituation.
Due in no small part to the fact that a few states have no com-
pensation or accident reporting laws, no one knows with any fair
degree of accuracy how many industrial accidents occur annually
in the United States. Using all the statistical data available, the
United States Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates that there are
every year in the United States, 2,543,418 industrial accidents which
cause a loss of more than 25,000,000 working days, with a total wage
loss of $1,022,264,866.9
III. GENERAL THEORY OF COMPENSATION LEGISLATION
Mr. Justice Pitney, speaking for a unanimous court in the well
known case of New York Central Railway v. White,'0 which upheld
the constitutionality of the present New York Act stated the general
principles of Workmen's Compensation Legislation as follows:
"Reduced to its elements the situation to be dealt with is this:
Employer and employee, by mutual consent, engage in a common
operation (intended to be advantageous to both. . . . In the
nature of things there is more or less of a probability that the em-
ployee may lose his life through some accidental injury arising out
of the employment, leaving his widow or children deprived of their
natural support, or that he may sustain an injury not mortal but
resulting in his total or partial disablement, temporary or permanent,
with corresponding impairment of earning capacity . ..
"This is a loss arising out of the business, and however it may
be charged up is an expense of the operation as truly as the cost of
repairing broken machinery or any other expense that ordinarily is
paid by the employer. Who is to bear the charge? It is plain that,
on grounds of natural justice, it is not unreasonable for the state
while relieving the employer from responsibility from damages
measured by common law standards and payable in cases where he,
or those for whose conduct he is answerable, are found to be at
fault, to require him to contribute a reasonable amount according to
:a reasonable and definite scale, by way of compensation for the loss
of earning power incurred in the common enterprise-irrespective
of the question of negligence, instead of leaving the entire loss to rest
'U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Monthly Labor Review, November,
1923.
"0 (1916) 243 U. S. 188.
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where it may chance to fall-that is, upon the injured employee or
his dependents. Nor can it be deemed arbitrary and unreasonable
from the standpoint of the employee's interest, to supplant a system
under which he assumed the entire risk of injury in ordinary cases,
and in others had a right to recover an amount more or less specu-
lative upon proving facts of negligence that were often difficult to
prove, to substitute a system under which in all ordinary cases of
accidental injury, he is sure of a definite and easily ascertained com-
pensation, not being obliged to assume the entire loss in any case but
in all cases assuming any loss beyond the prescribed scale.
"Much emphasis is laid upon the criticism that the act creates
liability without fault. . . Liability without fault is not a nov-
elty in the law. The common law liability of the carrier, of the inn-
keeper, or him who employed fire or other dangerous agency, or
harbored a dangerous animal, was not dependent altogether upon
questions of fault or of negligence."
The fundamental idea underlying compensation statutes is that
since the injury to the worker is an incident in the process of pro-
duction, the industry should include compensation for the injury as
one of the elements in the final cost of the production. Just as a
mill owner must pay for repairing a broken machine, he should pay
the economic loss resulting from injuries to workers in the course of
their employment. The expense in both cases is to be taken into
account in fixing the selling price of the finished product. In other
words, all of us, and not merely the luckless workman injured, should
bear the loss incident to the operation of modern civilization. In
order to accomplish this result the law imposes "a legal liability upon
some one who is in a position to bear it in the first instance, and
imposes it ultimately upon the community in the way of charges for
services rendered."
11
It has often been suggested that such a rule will make workmen
careless and that it is unfair to hold the employer liable when he is
not at fault. As a matter of fact no American Compensation Act
compensates for pain and suffering or even gives full economic
reparation. It is submitted that a workman who did not value his
life and limbs more than partial economic reparation would indeed
be a rara avis.
As to the second suggestion, Dr. Downey makes these pertinent
remarks :12
Pound, (1924) Law and Morals, pp. 80-81.
Downey, Workmen's Compensation, 8, 9.
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"Broadly considered, the injuries which so arise in the course of
employment are nobody's fault, in a personal sense-workmen did
not intend suicide nor do employers desire the death or maiming of
employees. Every accident, it is true, may be ultimately traceable
to some act or omission, some want of foresight or insight, some
failure of attention, skill or care, on the part of some human agent.
But this is only to say that to omniscience the unexpected does not
occur. Humanly speaking, as all intensive studies or mass statistics
go to show, work injuries, in the main, are attributable to inherent
hazards of industry. . . . So much is this the case that each
industrial employment comes to have a predictable total hazard; of
a thousand men who erect structural steel a certain number will fall
to death, and of a thousand girls who feed metal strips into stamping
presses a certain number will have their fingers crushed. By the
same token, every consumable commodity may be said to have a defi-
nite cost in human suffering-a life for so many tons of coal, a
mangled hand for so many laundered shirts.'"
The Chairman of the Employer's Liability Commission of Ohio' 3
stated that:
"Fault or negligence of the employer can be proven in much less
than 20 per cent of the cases, and what is more startling, no matter
how careful the employee and employer are, or how high the effi-
ciency of the state may rise in the prevention of accidents, the cause
of 50 to 55 per cent of all accidents to employees is solely due to
the natural hazards or dangers of the business. . . . On the
other hand, the cause of 16.8 per cent of all accidents is traceable
to the negligence of employers and the cause of 28.9 per cent of all
accidents is attributable to the negligence of employees.
"Under the practical operation of the common law remedy based
upon fault, it is impossible to prove the employers negligent in any-
thing like 16.8 per cent of the cases of injuries to employees. For
that reason, the old theory of making fault the basis for an action for
compensation to injured workmen has been abandoned."
When we find that more than half of the injuries to workmen
occur as a result of natural hazards rather than negligence, it seems
clear that a system which leaves all of these out of account is far
from satisfactory. Certainly it is far better to hold the employer
absolutely liable and let him figure this in his expenses than let half
the workmen injured in the industry bear a blow incurred by no
fault of their own, aid which their economic status does not allow
them to shift directly to the consumer, but which the general public
'J. H. Boyd, (1911) 38 Annals of American Academy of Political and
Social Science, 23.
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has to bear in the guise of appropriations for hospitals, poor houses,
and homes for the unfortunate.
IV. HISTORY OF COMPENSATION LEGISLATION
The first workmen's compensation law was enacted in Germany
in 1884. Austria followed in 1887. Great Britain's first compen-
sation act was passed in 1897. This movement gained headway
with great rapidity. At the present time, at least 50 foreign countries
and provinces have some sort of workmen's compensation for indus-
trial accidents, covering altogether some 60,000,000 wage earners, and
paying benefits ranging from 60 to 80 per cent of the wages received
at the time of the injury. Practically all of the countries of Europe
and the provinces of Canada and Australia had enacted compen-
sation legislation before the first compensation law was enacted in
the United States.
14
In the United States the period that might be called the period
of investigation began somewhat late as compared with the Euro-
pean countries. The first American state legislative commissions that
led to the enactment of laws were appointed in New York, Wis-
consin, and Minnesota in 1909; legislation followed in New York
in 1910, in Wisconsin in 1911, and Minnesota in 1913. Since 1909
at least 36 commissions, either appointed or voluntary, have con-
sidered the subject of compensation, and compensation legislation
has been enacted and is today in force in 43 of the American states
as well as in Alaska, Hawaii, Porto Rico, and the Philippine Islands.
At the present time the only American states which have no compen-
sation laws are Arkansas, Mississippi, Florida, and the two Caro-
linas. In every state in which the legislature has appointed a com-
mission to study the matter, compensation legislation has followed
the commission's report, except in the case of the Arkansas commis-
sion appointed in 1919.
As far back as 1911 the. Supreme Court of Washington in uphold-
ing the constitutionality of the Washington Act, speaking through
Judge Fullerton said :15
"It was the belief of the legislature that they (losses through acci-
dent) should be borne by the industries causing them, or perhaps
more accurately by the consumers of the products of such industries.
"' This and the following paragraph is based on information contained in
U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletins 203, 272, 275, and 1 Schneider
(1920) Workmen's Compensation Law, section 2.
"State v. Clausen (1911) 65 Wash. 156, 117 Pac. 1101.
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That the principle thus sought to be put into effect is economically,
sociologically, and morally sound, we think must be conceded ...
It is so conceded by all modern statesmen, jurists, and economic writ-
ers who have voiced their opinion on the subject and all of the
civilized countries of Europe. . . . Indeed so universal is the
sentiment that to assert to the contrary is to turn against the enlight-
ened opinion of mankind."
In view of such statements coming from men as conservative as
Supreme Court justices usually are, and the presumption in favor of
workmen's compensation legislation created by its widespread adop-
tion, it behooves North and South Carolina to seriously ask them-
selves whether they can longer afford to ignore the experience of
sister states. Certainly something more than a general denial of the
principle involved, without an adequate investigation of the present
conditions in each state, is demanded. Most assuredly North and
South Carolina do not want to "be different" at the expense of
sanity and progress.
V. GENERAL THEORY OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM
1. Duties of the Employer
Under the present system of employers' liability in North and
South Carolina, an employer must use ordinary care for the safety
of those in his employment, provide a reasonably safe place to work,
reasonably safe tools and appliances, and a sufficient number of
reasonably competent and careful workmen to conduct his business
in a reasonably safe manner. He must instruct inexperienced em-
ployees engaged in the performance of hazardous duties and warn
the employees of the dangers which are not readily discoverable by
them but which are or ought to be known to him. In general any
breach of this duty to exercise reasonable care is negligence and for
an injury to an employee approximately caused thereby, the employer
is liable. But an employer who has exercised reasonable care in
these respects, is not liable for industrial accidents to employees that
inevitably occur despite these precautions. In other words, the in-
herent hazards of the industry fall exclusively upon the employees.
2. The Employer's Defenses
Unless an employer is remiss in the performance of one or more
of the duties just discussed, an employee will have no ground of
action against him for an injury arising out of the employment.
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Even where an employer had failed to perform one of these duties
and an injury is approximately caused thereby, the employer may
still be able to avoid liability by setting up one or more of the defenses
available to him. These defenses are contributory negligence,
assumption of risk, and the fellow servant rule.
a. Contributory Negligence
Under the doctrine of contributory negligence, even though an
employer may have neglected to perform his duty and his neglect
may have been a concurrent cause of an injury to an employee, the
latter cannot recover if his own negligence contributed in any degree
to produce the injury. It matters not that the negligence of the
employee may have been slight and that of the employer gross by
comparison; if the injured employee by the use of due care, could
have avoided the accident, he cannot recover.
b. Assumption of Risk
Under the doctrine of assumption of risk, on accepting employ-
ment, the employee assumes all the ordinary risks incident to the
employment, whether it be dangerous or otherwise, and all risks
which he either knows or in the exercise of reasonable care should
know to exist. The theory upon which this doctrine is based is,
that it was the privilege of the employee to refuse employment or
if already employed, to demand that the defects be repaired and quit
his job when compliance was refused.
c. The Fellow-Servant Rule
Logically the fellow-servant rule is a phase of the doctrine of
assumption of risk, but for the sake of convenience, it will be treated
in this paper as a separate defense. This rule is that among the
ordinary hazards of the industry which the employee assumes and
for which the employer is not liable, are included those arising
from the negligence of co-employees or fellow-servants. As pre-
viously stated the employer is under a duty to exercise reasonable
care in the selection of employees and to discharge any that have
shown themselves to be reckless or incompetent. But in general the
employer is not answerable to one employee for the negligent acts
or omissions of another who is engaged in the same common
employment.' 6
18 The general propositions of liability herein stated are supported by prac-
tically all the authorities. See cases discussed and cited infra.
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3. Criticism of the Present Theory
The present law of employers' liability was formulated during
the period when motor driven machinery was in its infancy, and as
a rule employees worked with hand tools side by side with the em-
ployer, and injuries generally occurred in the latter's presence and
resulted from his negligent conduct or that of the injured man or
another servant. But the advent of modern machinery and the
erection of modern factories has largely taken away the personal
relationship between the employer and the employee. As this rela-
tionship becomes more remote it becomes increasingly difficult to
prove that the employer was negligent in any particular case.
The present system is based on the extreme individualistic notions
which were current in much of the juristic writings of the past cen-
tury, but which, due perhaps in part to the writings of sociological
jurists, are happily disappearing. The common law of employers'
liability assumes that every workman is in a position to chose his
own occupation, to quit it when he will and to exact whatever wage
he can. The fact is that abstractions proceeding upon a theoretical
equality do not fit a society divided into classes by conditions of
industry. Generally speaking, the workman assumes the risk of acci-
dents because he needs food and clothing, and the wages received,
are fixed by competition, not by the hazard of the employment. Under
the doctrine of assumption of risk, the workman must assume the
risk, both physically and finacially, of inevitable accidents or quit
his job, and, of course, few workmen are in a position to take the
latter alternative. To a large extent, this statement is also true of
injuries which are commonly regarded as due to the negligence of
the employee.
Dean Roscoe Pound ably satirized the theory on which our pres-
ent system is based when he said :17
"In the law of torts, few doctrines have been more irritating
than those of assumption of risk and contributory negligence, as
applied to injuries to employees. . . . The employee is a free
man, guided by his own conscience. . . . He chooses for him-
self. So choosing, he elects to work in a dangerous employment in
which he runs a risk of being injured. He knows that others are to
be employed with him; he knows that they may be negligent and
that if they are, he may be injured. Very well; he is a free man, let
him bear the loss. The master has done no wrong. The servant
. . .must stand or fall by the consequences of his own conduct.
"T Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law, 47.
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. . . Again, a workman, engaged constantly upon a machine, so
that he comes to be a part of it and to operate mechanically himself,
omits a precaution and is injured. The common law says to him,
'You are a free man, you have a mind and are capable of using it;
you chose freely to do a dangerous thing and were injured; you
must abide the consequences.' As a matter of fact, it may well be
that he did not and could not choose freely. Before the days of
workmen's compensation it was said that statistics showed the great
majority of industrial accidents happened in the last working hour
of the day, when the faculties were numbed and the operative had
ceased to be the free agent which our theory contemplated. But
there was no escape from the legal theory. That very condition was
a risk of the employment, and was assumed by the laborer."
VI. How THE PRESENT SYSTEM WoRKS IN PRAcTIcE
1. Abstracts of Cases Taken to the Supreme Court
The last twenty volumes of the North Carolina Supreme Court
Reports (Vol. 169-190 inclusive) have been searched in order to get
the most recent information on the subject, while volumes 110
through 124 of the South Carolina Reports were gone through. Of
course only a small percentage of the actual number of cases involv-
ing industrial injuries ever reach the Supreme Court. But because
the cases that do go up to that court are the most hotly contested
cases, they perhaps show most clearly the good or evil in our present
system. An abstract is set out below of forty casds, selected as
representative, from the Supreme Court reports of the two Caro-
linas, stating in so far as is ascertainable from the reports, the cause
and nature of each injury, the date of the injury, the trial and the
decision on appeal, the issues involved, and the decision of the jury,
the trial court, and the Supreme Court. In this study, some 88 cases
in all were digested, 44 from North Carolina and 44 from South
Carolina. The cases not abstracted below are treated in footnote
58 herein.
Cochran v. Young-Hartsell Mills Co.18
The plaintiff was a mechanic employed in the defendant cotton
mill and was injured by the alleged negligence of the defendant in
removing the ground wire of a motor without notifying the plaintiff
of that fact, so that the plaintiff was badly burned with the result
that one leg had to be removed; defense of contributory negligence.
The injury occurred on Sept. 13, 1913, and trial was had in Nov.
1914 resulting in a verdict of $5000 for the plaintiff; this was
affirmed May 5, 1915.
-169 N. C. 57, 85 S. E. 149.
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Lynch v. Carolina Veneer Co.1 9
Action for personal injuries to the plaintiff while in the employ
of the defendant; the plaintiff's task was to handle logs in the boil-
ing vats of the defendant, by standing upon a narrow platform from
which the railing had rotted away and it is alleged that the absence
of the railing caused the injury to the plaintiff, whereby he fell into
the vat and was seriously burned; defense of contributory negli-
gence. No date of the injury is given but trial was had in Sept. 1914,
resulting in a verdict for the plaintiff, the amount of damages not
being given. This was affirmed May 19, 1915.
Klunk v. Blue Pearl Granite Co.20
Action to recover damages for injuries to the plaintiff while in
the defendant's employ in that while he was so engaged, as a stone
cutter, a small piece of a defective tool struck his eye, thus causing
the loss of sight in one eye. No date of the injury is given but the
first trial was held in the spring of 1915 resulting in a nonsuit from
which the plaintiff appealed. The fall term, Nov. 10, 1915, sent the
case back for a new trial.
Renn v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co.21
Action under the Federal Act for injuries to the plaintiff due to
the defendant's alleged negligence in allowing ice to stay upon a foot-
path, thus causing the plaintiff to fall. The injury occurred on Jan.
15, 1912; defense of assumption of risk was set up. The trial re-
sulted in $3500 damages for plaintiff in June, 1915; that was af-
firmed Nov. 17, 1915.
Yarborough v. Geer Co. 2 2
Action for injuries to the plaintiff while an employee of the de-
fendant Fire Proofing Construction Co., caused by the plaintiff's
falling off of a scaffold which was due to the alleged negligence of
the defendant in the erection thereof. Defense of assumption of
risk was set up. The date of the injury is not given but the trial
was had in Nov. 1915, resulting in a verdict for the plaintiff for
$5000 from which the defendant appealed. Verdict affirmed April
12, 1916.
Parker v. Marlboro Cotton Mills3
Action by the plaintiff cotton mill employee for injuries received
during the course of his employment, it being alleged that the injury
S169 N. C. 169, 85 S. E. 289.
170 N. C. 70, 86 S. E. 800.
,170 N. C. 129, 86 S. E. 964.
21171 N. C 334, 88 S. E. 474.
114 S. C. 156, 103 S. E. 512.
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occurred because a belt broke with result that the employee's arm
was broken; defense of assumption of risk. The trial court granted
a nonsuit. The injury occurred Oct. 2, 1915; trial was had in sum-
mer of 1919; and this was reversed for a new trial June 28, 1920.
Morgan v. Springstein Mills
24
Action for injury to plaintiff, while in the employ of the cotton
mill, it being shown that the injury occurred due to a fellow servant
starting an engine too soon, thus mangling plaintiff's hand; defense
of assumption of risk in that plaintiff knew the fellow servant to be
insane. No date of the injury is given; trial was had in the spring
of 1918 resulting in verdict for plaintiff, amount not given; this was
reversed and a nonsuit ordered Jan. 27, 1919.
Lynch v. Dewey Bros 2 5
Action for damages to the plaintiff while in the employ of the
defendant planing mill, due to the defendant's alleged negligence in
keeping an old machine, whereby two fingers on plaintiff's hand were
cut off while he was doing certain planing. The injury occurred in
Aug. 1917 and trial was had in Nov. 1917 resulting in a verdict for
the plaintiff, the amount of damages not being given; this was af-
firmed Feb. 27, 1918. The defense set up was that of contributory
negligence.
Winborne v. Cranberry Furnace Co.2 6
Plaintiff, a carpenter, was employed by the defendant cooperage
company for the purpose of taking down some cars to salvage the
iron, and in the course of such employment, while plaintiff held a
cold chisel which his helper struck with an axe, plaintiff's foot was
severely injured by the axe head flying off and striking him-there
was an allegation of negligence on the part of defendant for furnish-
ing a defective tool and the defense was that of contributory negli-
gence. The injury occurred in Aug. 1917 and the trial was held in
April 1919 resulting in $550 damages for the plaintiff; this was
reversed Sept. 24, 1919, and sent back with instructions to sustain
defendant's motion for a nonsuit.
Barnes v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. and American Express Co.
2 7
Action for the death of the plaintiff's intestate caused by the al-
leged negligence of the defendants; deceased was employed in load-
ing a heavy shafting into one of the cars under the direction of the
express company's agent; defense of contributory negligence. No
date of the injury is given but the first trial was had in March 1919
111 S. C. 368, 97 S. E. 825.
175 N. C. 152,95 S. E. 94.
178 N. C. 88, 100 S. E. 194.
T 178 N. C. 264, 100 S. E. 519.
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resulting in a nonsuit as to both defendants; this was reversed for a
new trial on Oct. 15, 1919.
Beck v. Sylva Tanning Co.28
Action for personal injuries to plaintiff alleged to have been
caused by the negligence of the defendant tannery, while plaintiff
was in its employ. The injury was caused by plaintiff's stumbling
over obstructions negligently left in the walk ways between tubs, in
such a way that plaintiff fell into a tub, thus having his feet and legs
severely burned; defense of contributory negligence and assumption
of risk. No date of the injury is given but trial was had in May
1919 resulting in verdict for the plaintiff, damages not given. This
was affirmed Dec. 20, 1919.
Jones v. Taylor and Co.
29
Action for damages by the plaintiff, an employee of the defendant
construction company. It appeared that the plaintiff was engaged in
breaking up stone by the use of a sledge hammer and while so en-
gaged, a piece of stone flew off putting out one eye; defense of con-
tributory negligence and assumption of risk. The injury occurred
in March 1917; trial was had in Oct. 1919 resulting in a verdict for
the plaintiff for $2000; this was affirmed May 10, 1920.
Berry v. Dillon Mills3
°
Action by plaintiff, an employee of the mill, for injuries sustained
in the course of his employment; plaintiff attempted to put out a
fire and in doing so, wet a moving belt which ran off its pulley and
inflicted serious injuries; defense of contributory negligence and
assumption of risk. No date of the injury is given; trial was had
in the spring term, 1921, resulting in verdict for plaintiff, amount not
given; this was affirmed Aug. 17, 1922.
Harwell v. Columbia Mills 1
Action by employee of the mill for injuries sustained during the
course of the employment, it being alleged that plaintiff slipped on
the floor which was wet due to a leaky ice box; defense of assumption
of risk and the fellow servant rule. The injury occurred Oct. 4,
1916; trial was had in the summer of 1918 resulting in verdict for
plaintiff, amount of damages not given; this was affirmed Jan. 27,
1919.
- 179 N. C. 123, 101 S. E. 498.
179 N. C. 293, 102 S. E. 397.
20 120 S. C. 333, 113 S. E. 348.
112 S. C. 177, 98 S. E. 324.
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Kinsley v. Collection Cypress Co.32
Action for damages for the death of plaintiff's intestate which
occurred while he was in the course of his employment with defend-
ant as a feller of trees; it appeared that deceased was inexperienced;
that when the tree he was cutting started to fall, he ran in the oppo-
site direction and was hit by a dead tree which fell at the same time;
defense of contributory negligence and assumption of risk. No date
of the injury appears; trial was had in March 1921 resulting in ver-
dict for plaintiff, amount of damages not given; this was reversed
Jan. 25, 1922 with instructions that a verdict should have been di-
rected for defendant.
McMeekin v. Walker Elec. and Plumbing Co.33
Action by the defendant's foreman for injuries caused by the
alleged negligence of the defendant; it appeared that defendant em-
ployed a group of unskilled, foreign workmen who could not under-
stand plaintiff's orders, with the result that they brought two large
pipes together in such a way as to cut off two fingers; defense of
contributory negligence and assumption of risk. No date of the
injury is given but trial was had in the fall of 1919, resulting in a
verdict for the plaintiff, the amount of damages not being given;
this was affirmed June 28, 1920.
McMahan v. Carolina Spruce Co.34
Suit by plaintiff, an employee of the defendant lumber company,
alleging two causes of action and seeking damages; first, plaintiff
claimed that while in the course of his employment working on de-
fendant's lumber dock, that due to defendant's negligence in failing-
to furnish sufficient help, the plaintiff's left arm was broken in two
places; second, that the doctor employed by the defendant to treat its
employees administered aid to the plaintiff in such a negligent man-
ner that serious consequences resulted. Defense of contributory
negligence. No date of the injury is given but trial was had Aug.
1920 resulting in a verdict for plaintiff with $6335 damages on the
two counts; this was affirmed Dec. 24, 1920.
Capps v. Atl. Coast Line R. R. Co.3 5
Plaintiff's intestate was a carpenter employed by the defendant
and was killed in Virginia in the course of such employment, and
this action resulted for alleged negligence in connection with the
death. Plaintiff first brought suit under the federal statute but was
nonsuited and then sought to recover under the Virginia statute
"118 S. C. 234, 110 S. E. 393.
-114 S. C. 346, 103 S. E. 590.
,180 N. C. 636, 105 S. E. 439.
"5 183 N. C. 181, 111 S. E. 533.
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which contained a provision that suit must be started within one year
after the injury, with which provision the plaintiff failed to comply,
hence the action was finally dismissed. The injury occurred Aug.
16, 1915; the first action was instituted in May 1916, and finally dis-
missed March 22, 1922.
Gaither v. Clement Co.36
While in the course of his employment with the defendant con-
struction company as a carpenter, plaintiff was injured by having an
eye put out while trying to unloose a drill and this action resulted
for damages, alleging that the defendant had failed to furnish plain-
tiff with the proper equipment; defense of contributory negligence.
The date of the injury is not given but trial was had in Nov. 1921
resulting in a verdict for the plaintiff, the amount of damages not
being given; this was reversed for a new trial May 3, 1922, because
of lower court's instructions holding defendant to a higher standard
than due care.
Tritt v. Lumber Co.3
Action for damages for the death of the plaintiff's intestate due
to the alleged negligence in so jerking the train upon which the de-
ceased was a brakeman, that he was knocked off and killed; defense
of contributory negligence. The injury occurred on June 4, 1921
and trial was had in Dec. 1921 resulting in a verdict for the plaintiff,
the amount of damages not being given. This was reversed for new
trial May 17, 1922, because of charge of lower court holding em-
ployer to too high a standard of care.
Lacey v. Ideal Hosiery Co.38
Action for injury to the plaintiff while in the'regular course of
his employment with the defendant, it being alleged that the plain-
tiff's arm was so badly torn that it had to be amputated; defense of
contributory negligence. The injury occurred in July, 1919, and the
trial took place in Feb. 1922 resulting in $7131 damages for the
plaintiff and this was affirmed Sept. 13, 1922.
McKinney v. Adams Co.39
While in the course of his employment with the defendant lum-
ber company, plaintiff was injured by cutting his foot while using
defendant's axe which was alleged to have had a handle known to
the defendant to be defective; no evidence offered by defendant.
" 183 N. C. 450, 111 S. E. 782.
- 183 N. C 830, 111 S. E. 872.
184 N. C. 19, 113 S. E. 497.
- 184 N. C. 562, 114 S. E. 872.
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The injury occurred in Sept. 1919; trial was had in July 1922 re-
sulting in verdict for plaintiff for $1000 and this was affirmed Dec.
20, 1922.
Pollard v. Savannah River Lumber Co.40
Plaintiff was employed as a grader in defendant's mill when the
injury occurred, alleged to have been caused by defendant's negli-
gence in failing to cover properly a trim saw so that plaintiff's hand
was badly cut; defense of contributory negligence and assumption of
risk. No date of the injury is set out but trial was had in the spring
of 1919 resulting in a verdict for the plaintiff, the amount of dam-
ages not being given; this was affirmed on Aug. 26, 1919.
Richardson v. Union Seed & Fertilizer Co.41
Plaintiff was employed by the defendant to do some creosote
painting and furnished a brush obviously defective; as a result plain-
tiff's eyes were injured; defense of assumption of risk. No date of
the injury is given but the case was tried July 11, 1918 resulting in
a nonsuit for the plaintiff; this was affirmed Jan. 21, 1919.
Tisdale v. Union Tanning Co.
42
Action for the alleged negligent killing of plaintiff's intestate
while he was in the course of his employment with the defendant;
defense of assumption of risk. At the close of the evidence, the
court directed a nonsuit from which the plaintiff appealed. The
injury occurred in Jan. 1923; and the case was sent back for a new
trial May 26, 1923.
Beal v. Carolina Coal Co.43
Action for personal injury to the plaintiff, an employee of the
defendant mining company. The injury occurred Apr. 25, 1923,
while plaintiff was on duty, the cause being an explosion which took
off plaintiff's right arm and caused other injuries. Trial was had
in July 1923 resulting in damages for the plaintiff, the amount not
given; affirmed Dec. 20, 1923. The type of defense is not set out.
Whitt v. Rand and Ward
44
Plaintiff, an employee of the defendant construction company,
was injured by having a piece of stone strike his eye while in the
course of his employment as a chiseler; the alleged negligence was
" 112 S. C. 553, 100 S. E. 145.
111 S. C. 387, 98 S. E. 134.
- 185 N. C. 497, 117 S. E. 583.
"186 N. C. 754, 120 S. E. 333.
" 187 N. C. 805, 123 S. E. 84.
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failure to provide eye glasses or goggles; defense of assumption of
risk. The injury occurred Aug. 28, 1922 and the trial court awarded
$2000 damages in Mar. 1924 which was affirmed May 31, 1924.
Dellinger, Adm. v. Elliott Building C0.
45
Action for damages for the death of plaintiff's intestate who was
killed by an accident while in the defendant's employ. No date of
the injury appears but trial was had in Jan. 1924 when plaintiff
obtained $5000 damages; plaintiff's case was based upon negligence
and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur while the defendant pleaded
contributory negligence and the fellow servant rule. Decision af-
firmed May 31, 1924.
Medford v. Rex Spinning Co.
4 6
Action by the plaintiff against the defendant employer for in-
juries to his hand received in the course of his employment while
adjusting belt on moving machine to which the defendant pleaded
assumption of risk and contributory negligence. The time of the
injury is not given but trial was had in Oct. 1923 resulting in judg-
ment for the plaintiff, the amount not set out. New trial was granted
June 21, 1924, for error in instructions.
Michaux v. Lassiter and Co.
47
Action for personal injuries to the plaintiff's intestate an em-
ployee of the defendant road contractor. The defense interposed
was that of the fellow servant rule and that no negligence on the
part of defendant was shown. The injury occurred in May 1922;
trial was had in Nov. 1923 at which the plaintiff was nonsuited;
defense of the fellow servant rule being applied. Judgment affirmed
June 21, 1924.
Cobia v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co.
48
Case tried under the Federal Employers' Liability Act; deceased
was killed Dec. 14, 1922; the case was tried in March 1924 resulting
in verdict for $4000 from which defendant appealed. The defenses
set up were assumption of risk, contributory negligence, and the fel-
low servant rule. The decision was affirmed Oct. 29, 1924.
Mangum v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co.
49
Action under the federal act for permanent injuries to plaintiff
due-to the defendant's alleged negligence. It appeared that as the
" 187 N. C. 845, 123 S. E. 78.
188 N. C. 125, 123 S. E. 257.
" 188 N. C. 132, 123 S. E. 310.
188 N. C. 487, 123 S. E. 18.
" 188 N. C. 689, 125 S. E. 549.
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train upon which the plaintiff was a fireman neared a town crossing,
it collided with a car in such a way that the train was derailed; the
act of negligence alleged was that the cowcatcher was not in such
condition to shove objects out of the way. No specific defense is
set out. The injury occurred Dec. 13, 1921; trial was had in March,
1924 resulting in a verdict of $22,500 for plaintiff, $15,000 being
for permanent injuries and $7,500 for pain and suffering; this was
affirmed Dec. 10, 1924.
Crisp v. Hanover Thread Mills5O
Jury trial was had in May 1924; appeal and the verdict affirmed
Jan. 24, 1925; no date of the injury being given. Action for injuries
to plaintiff, employee of the defendant mills, the former's job being
to carry out spools from the thread machine. The injury was al-
leged to have been caused by the defendant's failure to furnish plain-
tiff with a helper to carry the great weight; defense of assumption
of risk. The trial court awarded $1000 damages and this was
affirmed.
Roberts v. Columbia Ry. & Naz/n. Co.51
Action for injuries resulting from exposure while plaintiff was
in the course of his employment with defendant; it appeared that
plaintiff was keeping logs from striking defendant's boat during a
flood; that the boat broke loose; that plaintiff was rescued by a gov-
ernment boat and set ashore upon an island and that in wading to
the mainland, plaintiff was caught and had to take to a tree and wait
8 hours before he was again rescued; defense of contributory negli-
gence. The injury occurred in Jan. 1915; trial was had in May 1919
resulting in damages for plaintiff; this was reversed March 22, 1921.
Nichols v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co.5 2
Action for injuries to plaintiff, a switchman, while coupling
cars, caused by a brick falling off the top of the car and striking
plaintiff in the eye; verdict of $500 for the plaintiff in the trial
court, June 1922. The defendant appealed and the case was re-
versed with instructions to direct a verdict for the defendant on
the grounds that no negligence was shown. No date of the injury
is given.
Southwell, Amd. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co.53
Plaintiff's intestate was an engineer employed by the defendant
and after putting his engine up for the night and while still on de-
- 189 N. C. 89, 126 S. E. 110.
115 S. C. 512, 106 S. E. 505.
-2122 S. C. 359, 115 S. E. 323.
' 189 N. C. 417, 127 S. E. 361.
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fendant's premises but on his way home, deceased was shot by the
assistant yard master, acting as special policeman during a strike.
Defense that the deceased was engaged in interstate commerce, hence
that this case is controlled by the federal act which predicates re-
covery upon proof of injury proximately resulting from defendant's
negligence and never upon willful homicide committed by the de-
fendant's employees. The injury occurred July 18, 1922; trial was
had in Oct. 1924 resulting in a nonsuit; and a new trial was
awarded April 8, 1925, because, in the court's opinion, there was
enough evidence of defendant's negligence to go to the jury.
Satchell, Adm. v. McNair and McKay
54
Action by plaintiff for the death of her 15 year old son alleged to
have been caused by defendant's negligence in employing the de-
ceased as a tripper for the sawmill contrary to the instructions of
the mother and also for negligence in handling the sawmill after
the deceased was employed. Held that the trial court erred in its
instructions and that the case must be sent back for a new trial.
Jury trial took place in Sept. 1924; and this was reversed April 15,
1925. No date of the injury appears.
Thomas v. W. H. and T. H. Lawrence55
Plaintiff was injured by a falling brick striking him on the head
while in the course of his employment with the defendant construc-
tion company; defense of assumption of risk and the fellow servant
rule. No date of the injury is given; trial was had in Sept. 1924
resulting in $5000 for plaintiff; and this was affirmed April 22, 1925.
Barnes and Walden v. Phoenix Utility Co."0
Action for damages for the death of the plaintiff's intestate,
alleged to have been caused by defendant's negligence in providing a
safe place to work. The injury occurred Nov. 13, 1924, suit was
brought in March 1925 resulting in $6500 damages for the plaintiff
from which the defendant appealed; defenses of contributory negli-
gence and assumption of risk. Decision affirmed Nov. 4, 1925.
Gordon v. Stehly Silks Corporation
57
Action against the defendant hosiery factory for serious injury
to the plaintiff's leg by being caught between uncovered cogwheels
which were alleged to have been negligently left uncovered. De-
fense of contributory negligence. No date of the injury is given but
189 N. C. 472, 127 S. E. 417.
189 N. C. 521, 127 S. E. 585.
190 N. C. 382, 130 S. E. 1.
5? 178 N. C. 470 100 S. E. 884.
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trial was had in March 1919 resulting in damages for the plaintiff,
the amount not being given; this was affirmed Nov. 19, 1919.58
Other cases analyzed follow:
NORTH CAROLINA-Gregory v. Easton Cotton Oil Co. (1915) 169 N. C.
454, 86 S. E. 162 (plaintiff denied damages for broken leg on ground that no
negligence of defendant was shown) ; Deligny v. Tate Furniture Co. (1915)
170 N. C. 189, 86 S. E. 80 (verdict of $1500 for broken arm sustained) ; Wooten
v. Holleman & Dennegan (1916) 171 N. C. 461, 88 S. E. 480 (carpenter denied
relief for injuries sustained when scaffolding gave way) ; Buchanan v. Cran-
berry Furnace Co. (1919) 178 N. C. 643, 101 S. E. 518 (recovery for broken
arm caused by rock failing from mine roof) ; Angell v. Carolina Spruce Co.
(1919) 178 N. C. 621, 101 S. E. 384 (lower court's judgment against plaintiff
for injuries caused by falling tree, reversed) ; Sutton v. Melton Rhodes Co.
(1922) 183 N. C. 369, 111 S. E. 63 ($1500 verdict for broken foot injured in
wood working machine) ; Moore v. Atl. Coast Line R. R. Co. (1923) 185 N. C.
189, 116 S. E. 409 (recovery for death under federal statute) ;, Wilson v. Black-
wood Lumber Co. (1923) 185 N. C. 571, 118 S. E. 1 (recovery for injuries to
back caused by defendant's failure to supply enough hands in lifting logs);
Murphey v. Suncrest Lumber Co. (1923) 186 N. C. 746, 120 S. E. 342 (type
of injury and amount of damages not set out) ; Hairston v. Erlanger Cotton
Mills (1924) 188 N. C. 557, 125 S. E. 124 ($700 for injured shoulder caused
by falling -weight) ; Corbitt v Royer Ferguson Co. (1924) 188 N. C. 565, 125.
S. E. 118 (recovery for hand mashed by defendant's negligence) ; Perkins v.
Wood & Coal Co. (1925) 189 N. C. 602, 127 S. E. 677 ($5000 for injuries
caused by defendant's servant allowing steam shovel to drop without warn-
ing) ; Richardson v. Am. Cotton Mills (1925) 189 N. C. 653, 127 S. E. 834
(verdict refusing damages for injuries reversed because of instructions);
Cable v. Kitchen Lumber Co. (1925) 189 N. C. 840, 128 S. E. 329 (new trial
granted because of error in instructions).
SOUTH CAxoLiNA-Barnhill v. Cherokee Falls Mfg. Co. (1919) 112 S. C.
541, 100 S. E. 151 (lower court's verdict denying damages for intestate's death
reversed) ; Farr v. Pacolet Mfg. Co. (1919) 112 S. C. 448, 100 S. E. 146
($3000 for injuries sustained by fall upon slippery floor reversed because of
instructions) ; Leopard v. Beaver Duck Mills (1921) 117 S. C. 122, 108 S. E.
190 (directed verdict for defendant reversed on grounds that there was evi-
dence of negligence) ; Howell v. Union Buffalo Mills (1923) 121 S. C. 133,
113 S. E. 577 (recovery for injury to eye caused by defective shell shooting oil
into face) ; Rickard v. Middleburg Mills (1919) 113 S. C. 137, 101 S. E. 643
(recovery for injury caused by carelessly stacked bale); Honercutt v. Pac.
Mills (1919) 111 S. C. 514, 98 S. E. 795 (recovery for injury, while moving
heavy box, and being struck by fellow servant doing same type of work);
Abbott v. Columbia Mills Co. (1918) 110 S. C. 298, 96 S. E. 556 (recovery for
injury to fingers while threading revolving spools); Wix v. Columbia Mills
(1918) 110 S. C. 377, 96 S. E. 616 ($2500 for fall caused by oil negligently
left on floor) ; Sentell v. Norris Cotton Mills (1919) 111 S. C. 430, 98 S. E_
141 ($3000 for loss of arm while cleaning carding machine); Ballinger v.
Fisk Carter Const. Co. (1919) 111 S. C. 434, 98 S. E. 193 ($2000 for death of
intestate caused by being thrown from railroad car) ; Henry v. Morris Bros.
Inc. (1919) 111 S. C. 437 98 S. E. 197 (recovery for severe wounds inflicted by
fall against revolving machine) ; Holmes v. Hamilton Ridge Lumber Co.
(1922) 120 S. C. 165, 112 S. E. 536 (recovery for injuries sustained while
coupling cars on defendant's logging road) ; Kell v. Fertilizer Co. (1923) 123
S. C. 199, 116 S. E. 97 (verdict reversed on grounds that there was evidence
of negligence) ; Bradley v. Van Wyck et al (1921) 111 S. C. 386, 108 S. E.
149 (nonsuit affirmed in action for death); Grice v. Hann et al (1921) 117
S. C. 106, 108 S. E. 195 (in suit for death, nonsuit reversed) ; Eargle v. Sumter
Lighting Co. (1918) 114 S. C. 346, 96 S. E. 909 (directed verdict for defendant
In suit for death of engineer reversed) ; Donald v. A. C. L. R. R. Co. (1921)
117 S. C. 4, 108 S. E. 180 ($5000 for death affirmed) ; Howell v. South. Ry. Co.
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2. Statistics and Other Data
Of the forty-four North Carolina cases involving personal in-
juries to employees which were studied, eleven were against con-
struction companies, eight against lumber companies, seven each
against cotton mills and railroads, two each against tanneries, mines,
planing mills, and one each against a veneer company, a cotton seed
oil mill, a furniture company, a granite company, and a cooperage
company. Forty were decided under the laws of North Carolina and
four under the Federal Employer's Liability Act. The reports show
that eleven of the injuries resulted in death, three in the loss of an
arm, one in the loss of a leg, five in a broken leg, two in a broken
arm, four in the loss of an eye, one in the loss of two fingers, one
in the loss of a foot, eleven in severe burning, one in cutting a foot,
eleven in permanent injuries, and eleven in injuries the type not
being specified.
The date of the injury is ascertainable from the reports in only
23 of the 44 cases. For these 23 cases, the average period between
(1920) 114 S. C. 21, 102 S. E. 856 (recovery for injuries sustained when sud-
den jar threw plaintiff under loose trucks in tool car) ; Grant v. Director Gen.
of Railroads (1920) 114 S. C. 89, 102 S. E. 854 (verdict for injuries, sus-
tained -by being thrown from a handcar, reversed for improper joinder of
parties) ; Washington v. A. C. L. R. R. Co. (1918) 110 S. C. 371, 96 S. E.
553 ($1200 for'broken leg) ; Cline v. South. Ry. Co. (1920) 101 S. C. 493, 86
S. E. 17; 110 S. C. 534, 102 S. E. 641 (series of actions extending over 6 years
for personal injuries to plaintiff who died before final appeal, affirming the
lower court's decision finally dismissing action).
SOUTH CAROLINA CASES BROUGHT UNDER FEDERAL EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY
Acr-Johnson v. A. C. L. R. R. Co. (1921) 112 S. C. 47, 99 S. E. 755; 116
S. C. 135, 107 S. E. 31 (nonsuit reversed because some evidence of negligence) ;
Strickland v. South. Ry. Co. (1918) 107 S. C. 521, 93 S. E. 187; 111 S. C. 248,
97 S. E. 695 ($8000 for death of intestate following blood poisoning incurred
while cleaning dirty air reservoir of locomotive) ; Williams v. C. & C. W. Co.
(1922) 121 S. C. 23, 113 S. E. 300 ($4000 for injuries sustained when defec-
tive rope broke) ; Mathews v. Payne, Director Gen. (1921) 121 S. C. 84, 113
S. E. 381 (recovery for flagman's death when rear of his train was hit by
approaching train) ; Southerland v. Davis (1923) 122 S. C. 511, 115 S. E. 768
($5790 for injuries sustained in course of employment); Thornhill v. Davis
(1922) 121 S. C. 49, 113 S. E. 370 ($14,600 for death caused by defendant's
negligence); Templeton v. C. & C. W. Ry. Co. (1921) 117 S. C. 44, 108 S. E.
363 ($5000 for injured brakeman reversed because of improper admission of
testimony) ; Patterson v. Director Gen. of Railroads (1921) 115 S. C. 390, 105
S. E. 746 (nonsuit to yard conductor, for injuries while operating switch
engine in violation of defendant's rules, affirmed) ; Pendergrass v. South. Ry.
Co. (1920) 114 S. C. 78, 103 S. E. 150 ($2000 for death of employee working
under car when it was hit by another shunted onto the switch in violation of
rules) ; McDowell v. South. Ry. Co. (1920) 113 S. C. 399, 102 S. E. 639 (non-
suit reversed on grounds that evidence should have been submitted to jury) ;
Harmon v. Seaboard Air Line (1918) 110 S. C. 153, 6 S. E. 253 (nonsuit
sustained where it was shown that back was strained while lifting timber) ;
Ettison v. South. Ry. Co. (1918) 110 S. C. 122, 96 S. E. 680 (recovery for
loss of arm caused by unexpected jerk of car).
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the date of the injury and the decision on appeal is twenty-six
months; and in five of those cases, the case was reversed by the
Supreme Court for further proceedings so that the above average
would be lengthened. It is noted that one case required six years
and eleven months for final determination.5 9 The average length of
the time required between the date of trial and the handing down
of the decision by the Supreme Court in these 44 cases, is seven and
one-half months, not taking into account the additional time involved
in those instances where the case is sent back for further proceed-
ings. Subtracting these two periods, we get eighteen and one-half
months as the average period between the date of an injury to an
employee and the trial in the Superior Court. Of these 44 cases, the
trial court's decision was affirmed in thirty-one instances, leaving
thirteen cases which were reversed for further proceedings. In
twenty-seven cases, the plaintiff recovered damages. The defenses
set up were as follows: assumption of risk in fourteen cases; con-
tributory negligence in twenty-one cases; and the fellow servant
rule in eight cases; in some cases two or more defenses were set up
while in a few the type of defense was not specified.
As to the 44 South Carolina cases which were studied, all of
which involved personal injuries to employees, eighteen were against
railroads, thirteen against cotton mills, six against lumber companies,
two against fertilizer companies, and one each against an electric
and plumbing company, an electric light company, a mattress fac-
tory, a street railway and navigation company, and an individual.
Thirty-two of these cases were decided under the laws of the state
and twelve under the Federal Employer's Liability Act. The re-
ports show that at least thirteen of the injuries resulted in death,
four in the loss of or injury to one or both eyes, and four in the loss
of an arm or leg. Three of these forty-four cases involved more
than one appeal to the Supreme Court. The date of the injury is
ascertainable from the reports in only fourteen of the other forty-
one cases. For these fourteen cases the average period between the
date of the injury and the date of the trial is twenty-one months.
In one of these forty-one cases, the date of trial is not stated in the
report. The average period between the date of the trial and the
decision on appeal in the other forty cases is twelve months. Ad-
ding these two periods, we get thirty-three months as the average
period between the date of an injury to an employee and a decision
- 135 N. C. 181, 111 S. E. 533.
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on the case involving it, by the Supreme Court. The delay in the
three cases which involved more than one appeal to the Supreme
Court is of course much longer. In one, 0° over four years elapsed
from the date of the injury and the affirmance on the second appeal
of a verdict for the plaintiff; in another, 61 four years and three
months; in the third case,0 2 six and one-half years elapsed between
the date of the injury and the third decision on appeal, affirming the
trial court's dismissal of the action.
Of the forty-one cases, twenty-nine were cases in which the em-
ployee had been victorious in the first round, all being based on ver-
dicts of juries. Twenty-two of these verdicts were allowed to stand
in the Supreme Court and seven were upset. In three of these seven
cases, the Supreme Court ordered a new trial, in three others a
verdict directed for the defendant, and in one a nonsuit. In other
words the injured man or his dependents got a final judgment award-
ing compensation in approximately one-half of the cases within the
scope of this inquiry.
Of the twelve cases decided under the Federal Employer's Liabil-
ity Act, the plaintiff secured a final judgment in only seven cases.
This seems to indicate that something more than the mere modifica-
tions of the doctrines of contributory negligence and the assumption
of risk is necessary in order to adequately protect injured employees
and their dependents.
Of the forty-four South Carolina cases within the scope of this
study, the Supreme Court was called upon to pass upon the appli-
cation of the rules as to the employers' negligence in fifteen, the
fellow servant rule in five, the employees' contributory negligence
in eighteen, and the employees' assumption of risk in twenty-seven.
The Federal Employer's Liability Act was passed by Congress,
acting under its power to regulate inter-state commerce, and applies
only to employees engaged in such commerce. It abolishes both the
doctrine of contributory negligence and the doctrine of assumption
of risk in cases in which the injury was caused wholly or in part by
the defendant's violation of any federal statute passed for the safety
of employees and in other cases allows contributory negligence to
diminish the amount recoverable but not entirely to defeat recovery.
- 112 S. C. 47, 99 S. E. 755; 116 S. C. 135, 107 S. E. 31.
107 S. C. 521, 93 S. E. 187; 111 S. C. 248, 97 S. E. 695.
- 101 S. C. 483, 86 S. E. 17; 110 S. C. 534, 96 S. E. 532; 113 S. C. 440,
102 S. E. 641.
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The truth of the matter is that a logical application by the jury
of these abstract rules as they exist in our Supreme Court Reports
today would have prevented a recovery in practically every one of
the cases considered, but fortunately for injured employees and their
dependents, these rules do not square with the layman's notion of
justice. This conflict between the law in the books and the law in
action is largely responsible for much of the present litigation be-
tween injured employees and their employers and the resulting inevi-
table delay and general dissatisfaction, because even in the ordinary
case, it makes the effective application of undisputed general prin-
ciples a matter of great uncertainty.
This difficulty was clearly recognized by Mr. Justice Marion in
Kell v. Fertilizer Co.,63 in which he said: "The correct application
of the familiar principles of employers' liability to the facts of a
given case, particularly one involving the doctrine of fellow servant,
is rarely free from difficulty."
It is submitted that this difficulty can only be satisfactorily
eliminated by following the lead furnished by forty-three of our
sister states: that is, enacting a Workmen's Compensation Act under
which the industrial employers are made insurers of all accidents to
their employees which arise in the scope of their employment, and
thereby eliminate all of the difficult issues previously considered.
With an adequate compensation law and a competent commission
to administer it, each of the eighty-eight plaintiffs in the cases ab-
stracted, would have received financial aid, certain and reasonable in
amount, and paid at the time when he or his family needed it most.
The eighty-eight employers, on the other hand, would have been
obliged to take out insurance against the accident risk, and this insur-
ance would have been immediately available and at the disposal of
the commission with a minimum of delay and worry for the
employee.
It may be urged that under the average Workmen's Compensation
Law the amount paid to the injured man by the commission falls
far short of that awarded to him by the jury. Of course there is a
considerable difference in particular cases. The data in the cases
within the scope of this inquiry obviously affords an insufficient
basis for any trustworthy general conclusions as to the amounts of
jury verdicts, but it does have a tendency to show that with a few
- 123 S. C. 199, 116 S. E. 97.
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exceptions Carolina jurors are not particularly magnanimous to
injured employees or their surviving dependents.
In comparinig the amounts of compensation payments with North
and South Carolina jury verdicts, under our present negligence
system, the attorney's fees and the cost of litigation should be con-
sidered, especially as most industrial accident cases are handled on
a contingent fee basis, ranging as high as fifty per cent of the judg-
ment. To sum up: under the present state laws, the injured em-
ployees or their surviving dependents, after waiting the average
period of thirty-three months in South Carolina and twenty-six
months in North Carolina, got a legal right in fifty per cent of the
cases to be paid such sums as the juries had awarded them, minus
attorneys fees and the cost of litigation.
The fact that most cases of industrial accidents are so clearly
covered by the ordinary Workmen's Compensation Act and the dam-
ages are so easily computed, makes settlement in the ordinary cases
almost a matter of routine, and largely eliminates the need of law-
yers. Even when the liability is contested, it is often not necessary
for the injured employee to be represented by a lawyer.
Reginald H. Smith of the Boston Bar, speaking of Workmen's
Compensation Acts and their administration by commissions, said :04
"Restriction of the attorneys' functions has been accomplished in
several ways. In lieu of writs, summonses, and declarations, there
are notices of injury and claims for compensation whose forms have
been simplified and standardized. There are no details of service
of process, for the mails are used. Questions of jurisdiction and
venue have no importance, for one commission acts for the entire
state. There are no pleadings and no interlocutory proceedings
worth mention. Trial lists and calendars are not used; every case
is assigned for hearing at a specific hour on a specific date, and
notice is sent by the commission to all parties. Thus all preliminaries
up to the point of trial, which in common law tort litigation re-
quired the services of counsel, are performed, either by the party
himself or by a clerk of the commission.
"The law itself is infinitely more simple. The whole question of
damages, on which many a lawyer has exercised his utmost ingenuity,
is reduced to mathematical precision, and in a given case the precise
award is determined by consulting a table which a grammar school
child could understand. The issue of liability is shifted from the
doubtful and contentious ground of negligence complicated by con-
tributory negligence, assumption of risk, and the fellow servant
rule, to injuries 'arising out of and in the course of the employment'."
"Smith, Justice and the Poor (1921-2nd ed.) 87.
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Under the present system of course, no actual money can be
recovered until after a lawsuit with all its concomitant expense,
delay, and uncertainty. The result is that the industrial victim
usually takes whatever is offered him by his employer or the shrewd
adjuster of the casualty company and signs a release of his rights.
This is without doubt invariably true of minor injuries, for the
amount involved is not sufficient to justify putting in motion the
present cumbersome legal machinery. Investigations of industrial
accidents, made in other states prior to the enactment of compen-
sation legislation are perhaps relevant.
The report of the New York Commission on Employers' Lia-
bility, appointed under Laws 1919 C. 518, states that of the two
hundred and twenty-seven fatal cases investigated, 93, or 41 per
cent, received nothing at all; 23, or 10 per cent, received less than
$100; 72, or 33 per cent, received $100 to $500; 16, or 7 per cent,
received $500 to $1000; 11, or 5 per cent, received $1000 to $2000;
9, or 4 per cent, received $2000 to $5000; and one per cent received
over $5000. The average for all these cases was only $531.
Of three hundred and twenty-three fatal cases investigated in
Pittsburg by Miss Crystal Eastman, 89, or 28 per cent, received
nothing at all; 113, or 35 per cent, received less than $100; 61, or
19 per cent, received $100 to $500; 41, or 13 per cent, received $500
to $1000; and 19, or 6 per cent, received over $1000. The situation
was even worse as far as non-fatal but permanently disabling injur-
ies was concerned.6 5
Recent investigations, in the District of Columbia, which, like
North and South Carolina, is one of the few political jurisdictions
still without compensation laws protecting private employees, show
similar results. Of over one hundred accidents investigated in that
jurisdiction, not a single employee who was seriously injured received
adequate recompense. Insurance adjusters offered them $25 for a
broken leg, $800 for a life, and more often nothing at all.66
VII. THE ATTITUDE OF INTERESTED PARTIES TOWARD
COMPENSATION LAW
From the preceding discussion, it seems reasonable to conclude
that North and South Carolina would benefit from an adequate
'This report and the report of the New York Commission are discussed
in detail in Robinow (1913) Social Insurance, 94.
"13 American Labor Legislative Review, 235.
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Workmen's Compensation Act, and that such an act would be both
a boon to industrial employees and to industrial employers. Those
who have studied the problems involved from the aspect of the em-
ployer and those who have studied them from the aspect of the
employee, generally unite in endorsing compensation legislation.
The legislation has the unique distinction of having been indorsed
both by organized capital and by organized labor, by the American
Federation of Labor, and the National Association of Manufactur-
ers, by the Railroad Brotherhoods, the Steel Corporation, and the
International Harvester Company.67
Mr. John B. Andrews, Secretary of the American Association
of Labor Legislation in a letter dated December 2, 1924, said: "In
my opinion a state which has failed to enact a workmen's compen-
sation law after the principle has been accepted practically through-
out the civilized world, indicates a backwardness which is difficult to
comprehend in a progressive country like the United States."
Mr. B. Harris, Commissioner of Agriculture, Commerce and
Industries of the State of South Carolina, wrote that he is heartily
in favor of a Workmen's Compensation Act. He has recom-
mended the passage of such a law by the General Assembly. 8
In order to ascertain the attitude of South Carolina employers
towards a compensation act, a mimeographed letter was sent, with
a self addressed postcard enclosed, to the president of each of the
one hundred and forty-five cotton mills listed in the 1920 federal
census for South Carolina. These mills are listed as employing
48,079 employees. In a few instances the, same man was listed as
president of two or more mills, so that the actual number of letters
mailed was one hundred and thirty-six. Each of these letters so-
licited a statement in the form of a letter of the addressee's attitude
toward such an act. In case he was too busy to write a letter, he
was requested to fill out and return the enclosed card which con-
tained space for a categorical answer as to whether or not he was
in favor of a compensation act.
In response to these letters, answers were received from forty-
one South Carolina cotton mill officers. Thirty-two of them without
any qualification, endorsed and approved a Workmen's Compensation
Act for South Carolina; four favored the principle involved but felt
that they could not give a proposed act unqualified approval without
'Downey (1924) Workmen's Compensation, 6.
'Sixteenth Annual Report (1924) 15.
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considering its exact terms, three were noncommittal; one stated
that he would be in favor of such an act provided the cost of work-
men's compensation insurance was not materially higher than his
present insurance; and only one stated that he was not in favor of
legislation of this type.
VIII. SUGGESTIONS AS TO DESIRABLE PROvISIONs OF A
COMPENSATION ACT
1. The Scope and Application
The act should be drawn so as to include all employees in speci-
fied wage or salary groups; in all industries employing five or more
employees including among others manufacturing, lumbering, trans-
porting, and merchandising enterprises; and state and municipal
employees, with agricultural laborers, domestic servants, and casual
employees specifically excluded. Every American compensation act
excludes agriculture except the acts in force in Hawaii and New
Jersey, and only New Jersey includes domestic service. Thirty-
three American state compensation acts exempt casual employees
and nine do not.6 9 Such exemptions are not discriminatory and do
not deny the equal protection of the laws.7 0 However wrong on
principle these exemptions may be, the political strength and eco-
nomic condition of the employers of such labor, and the administra-
tive difficulty of applying a compensation act to them, make their
exclusion from a proposed bill expedient.
Twelve of the forty-three state compensation acts exclude all
so-called non-hazardous employments.7 1 It is submitted that such
an exclusion is not desirable. An injury received in a mercantile
establishment may be just as severe and cause as much economic
distress as one received by a railroad employee. If an employment
has a low degree of hazard, the cost of compensation will be cor-
respondingly low. In states in which the act exempts non-hazardous
employments, some excluded employees e.g. clerical workers, are
usually employed by those conducting so-called hazardous employ-
ments. This makes needless administrative difficulties by raising
many close questions of inclusion or exclusion of particular em-
ployees. It is worth noting that New York after experience with a
m U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin 275, 23 and 24.
"New York Central Railroad Co. v. White (1917) 243 U. S. 188, 37 Sup.
Ct. 247.
I"Same as note 69 supra, p. 21.
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hazardous and non-hazardous classification, has included non-haz-
ardous employments.7
2
Compensation should be provided for all personal injuries in the
course of the employments covered by the act, except where the
injury is occasioned by the willful intention of the employee to bring
about the injury or death of himself or another. Occupational dis-
eases contracted in the course of the employment should be com-
pensable and are included in nine states.
7 3
The majority of the American compensation acts are elective in
form but not in substance. It is submitted that North and South
Carolina should follow the lead furnished by the twelve states which
frankly make their compensation acts compulsory. The so-called
elective acts usually create a conclusive presumption of election to
come within the provisions of the act unless the employer or em-
ployee files a statement of rejection with the commission prior to the
injury. If an employer makes such an election, his three common
law defenses, assumption of risk, the fellow servant rule, and con-
tributory negligence, are taken away from him. The result is that
the employer is virtually compelled to accept the act. This curious
feature is no doubt due to the general opinion current when most
of the acts were passed, that this was "a device by means of which
compensation legislation could be made to stand the test of constitu-
tionality where a compulsory act would fail."7 4
But the-United States Supreme Court has held in two relatively
recent decisions that a compulsory act is due process of law and
does not infringe any principle of the federal constitution. It has
been aptly said that, in view of these decisions, "any further attempt
to distinguish between the validity of a compulsory act and an elective
act with a penalty for non-election, is to indulge in exploded
casuistry." 7 5
As one of the weightiest arguments against the present system is
that it fritters away in law suits, money which should be used in
caring for the injured employees, the compensation provided by the
" Same as note 69 supra, p. 9.
" The substance of this paragraph is taken from Standards for Workmen's
Compensation Laws (1924) p. 8, published by the American Association for
Labor Legislation, 131 East 23rd St., New York City.
"'Laube, Administrative Problems in Wisconsin's Workmen's Compen-
sation (1925), 2 Wisc. Law Review 66, 73; Rhodes, Workmen's Compensation
(1917) 118.
" Laube, Op. Ct. Note 74 supra, p. 74.
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act should be made the employee's exclusive remedy against the
employer.7 6 Law suits against the employer by the employee are
not permitted in Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, New
Mexico, Vermont, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
2. Compensation Benefits
In general the employer should be required to pay the expense
of all necessary medical and surgical treatment and such a percentage
of the injured employee's wages as will provide for the resulting
needs and yet not encourage malingering. The compensation pay-
ments for total disability, either temporary or permanent, vary in
the different states from 50 to 66% per cent of the average weekly
wage of the employee during the year immediately preceeding the
injury. It is believed that the latter percentage is none too high and
is the one that should be adopted. If the employee who has been
totally disabled is a minor, he should after reaching twenty-one,
receive 66% per cent of the wages of able bodied men in the occu-
pation group in which he belonged.1 7 The employee who has been
only partially disabled should receive a percentage of his wages pro-
portionate to the degree of his disability. The statutes in many
states contain an elaborate schedule showing the per cent of impair-
ment in earning capacity which each specific injury may be expected
to cause to a worker of any given occupation. These schedules will
furnish convenient guides to the kind of statute needed in North
and South Carolina.
A moderate waiting period for which no compensation is payable
is justifiable on the grounds of administrative cost, the danger of
malingering, and the fact that the loss of wages for a short period
will not create a hardship for the average workman or his family.
The period is usually fixed at a week and in the writer's opinion,
certainly should not exceed a week.
Every practicing lawyer knows that securing a judgment against
even a solvent defendant and collecting it are often two very dif-
ferent things; and this is true even in the Carolinas. As the supreme
test of a compensation system is the promptness and certainty with
7' Same as note 73 supra, p. 9.
"See note 73 supra, Standard for Workmen's Compensation Laws (1924)
p. 4; the fact that the injured employee is a minor is taken into account in
fixing compensation in Cal., Colo., Conn., Ill., Iowa, Me., Mass., N. Y., N. D.,
Ohio, Okla., Tex., Utah, and Wisc.
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which compensation awards are met, obviously an act which fails to
require adequate security for the payment of compensation awards
will be defective. Alabama, Arizona, and Kansas are the only com-
pensation states which do not require the employer to secure the
payment of compensation due employees, either by insurance or by
the giving of a bond.
The premiums charged by the insurance carrier to employers as
a whole, must cover, of course among other things, the administra-
tive expenses of the insurance carrier. The United States Bureau
of Labor completed in August, 1920, an extended investigation of
workmen's compensation insurance and its administration in twenty
American states and two Canadian provinces, nine of which pro-
vided for exclusive state funds, nine others for competitive state
funds, and the remaining four had no state funds. This investiga-
tion7" showed that the average administrative expense ratio of stock
companies is approximately 38 per cent, of mutual companies about
20 per cent, of competitive state funds about 10.6 per cent, and of
exclusive state funds about 4 per cent. Thus an exclusive state fund
should cost the employers 30 per cent less than stock insurance and
16 per cent less than mutual insurance. It is submitted that this
enormous saving to employers makes it expedient for North Caro-
lina and South Carolina to follow the lead furnished by Nevada,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Washington, West Virginia, and
Wyoming, and adopt a system of exclusive state funds.
The usual method of creating this fund is to require all employers
within the provisions of the act to pay their premiums for several
months in advance. It would no doubt be expedient to make an
appropriation covering the administrative expenses during the first
year or two. After the second year, the cost of administering the
fund should be borne by the fund itself. Notwithstanding their
favorable rates to subscribers and their liberality to injured em-
ployees, most of the exclusive state funds have accumulated a large
catastrophe reserve.79 The usual method of securing such a reserve
is to provide that the state funds shall set aside 10 per cent of their
annual premium income as a catastrophe reserve until the reserve
equals $100,000 and 5 per cent thereafter until the reserve is suffi-
cient to cover the catastrophe hazard of all the subscribers to the
fund and to guarantee the solvency of the fund.80
U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin 301, p. 21.
' Same as note 78, p. 56.
8' Same as note 78, p. 55.
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3. The Administrative System
The most sweeping changes in the present law of employer's
liability will obviously fail to have the desired effect, unless there is
adequate machinery to get the actual money to the injured employees
or their surviving dependents with a minimum of delay and expense
to them. What form shall this machinery take? Of the forty-three
American states which have compensation acts, thirty-two have
answered this question by creating an administrative board or com-
mission, and the others have left the enforcement of the act to the
courts.81 No state has abandoned the administration of Workmen's
Compensation Acts by a commission, while at least three states have
substituted administration by commissions for administration by the
courts.8 2 The great predominance of the commission type of law
is apparently due to the marked advantages which a commission
possesses over an ordinary court in the disposition of cases such as
arise under compensation acts.
The present litigious theory and practice of the court procedure
involving inevitable delay and engendering a spirit of hostility be-
tween the parties83 seems unsuited to the needs of indemnity for
work injuries. Another objection to administration by the courts is
that some of the problems involved are beyond the effective scope
of any court. For example, courts cannot make an independent
investigation of the facts of a case or exercise effective supervision
over uncontested settlements. Ordinarily before an injured work-
man can enforce his rights in a court of law, he must take the initi-
ative, hire a lawyer, procure witnesses, await a hearing, and prosecute
his suit at his own expense or on the basis of an unfavorable con-
tingent fee. To an injured indigent person, a costly remedy is usually
in effect no remedy at all. As 75 per cent of the injured employees
earn less than $15 a week8 4 their obvious relief is financial relief
secured cheaply and quickly. To require them to resort to ordinary
court procedure for relief often in practice amounts to a total denial
' U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin 275, p. 114.
"U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin 272, p. 15.
' "The common-law theory of litigation is that of a fair fist fight, accord-
ing to the canons of the manly art, with a court to see fair play and prevent
interference. We strive in every way to restrain the trial judge and to insure
the individual litigants a fair fight, unhampered by mere consideration of jus-
tice." Pound, Do We Need a Philosophy of Law (1905) 5 Col. Law Review
339, 347.
"Smith, Justice and the Poor (1921, 2nd ed.) 87.
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of justice, or compels them to accept settlement on the insurance
adjuster's terms.
All of the thirty-two states having administrative commissions
require employers to report industrial accidents to the commissions
or to some other branch of the Department of Labor.8 6 This makes
it possible for the commission to supervise settlements by agreement,
and the actual work of the commission is actually advisory. A com-
petent authority has estimated that at least 95 per cent of all com-
pensation claims are settled by direct agreement between the parties
without reference to any tribunal, with the commission merely re-
viewing and approving the settlement.8 6 In case a claim is disputed,
use by the commission of independent investigators, impartial phy-
sicians, simple forms and procedure, and mail service, is admirably
adopted to quick, cheap and adequate determination of the dispute.
With a single commission having plenary jurisdiction over all indus-
trial injuries, it is possible to secure co6rdination of activities, to
perfect a state regulatory scheme, and make a scientific study of
such problems as accident prevention and rehabilitation.
North and South Carolina constitute a favorable field for the
operation of a Workmen's Compensation Act, and an act which fails
to provide for at least three adequately paid commissioners to ad-
minister it, will be defective. The present relatively small number
of industrial workers would enable the commissioners to acquire
first hand information and give them a fair opportunity to lay the
foundation for a system of compensating industrial injuries, of
which the states should justly be proud.
No argument premised upon prohibitive cost to the state or intol-
erable burden to the tax payers, should prevent the state from tak-
ing this important step. Also it should be remembered that the
creation of such a commission would materially lessen court expenses
for salaries of special circuit judges, and payments to court attend-
ants, juries, etc. When considered from this aspect alone, Massa-
chusetts has found that such a commission actually saved the state
more money than the entire appropriation for the commission.
87
Under any circumstances sufficient salaries should be paid to get
commissioners of real ability who are in sympathy with the spirit of
the act. It is believed that there would be far more likelihood of
Same as note 81, p. 124.
Downey, note 67 supra, p. 66.
Smith, note 84 supra, p. 90.
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securing such men if the tenure of office was fixed at not less than
six years and the power of appointment was given to the governor
to be exercised with the advice and consent of the Senate, than there
would be if -these offices were left for distribution between perennial
office seekers at a general election. Many of the compensation acts
provide for a six year tenure of office and the method of appoint-
ment mentioned.
To give greater dignity to the Commission and to expedite a
final decision in case of an appeal from a decision of the Commission,
the appeal should be directly to the Supreme Court of the state. The
commissioners should be fully equal to the circuit judges in intel-
lectual ability and general attainment, and the fact that the cases
which they decide involve a narrow range of subjects, should enable
them to become especially proficent in deciding them. It is therefore
submitted that to allow a possible double judicial review would in-
volve useless duplication and unnecessary expense and delay, and
hence is not consonant with the fundamental considerations behind
this legislation.
IX. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
It is submitted that the present system of employers' liability in
North and South Carolina is economically unwise and unfair, and
is productive of antagonism between employers and employees. It
results in a denial of .recovery in a large number of cases in which
the injury arose out of the employment, and in the cases in which
the plaintiff is successful, the attorney usually takes a large portion
of the net amount ultimately recovered. The uncertainty, expense,
and irritation of the present negligence-litigation system is so great,
that an injured employee who dares to sue his employer almost
invariably loses his job. In describing a similar situation it was
aptly said by Judge Sloss of the California Court, that it "involves
intolerable delay and great economic waste, gives inadequate relief
for loss and suffering, operates unequally between different indi-
viduals in like circumstances and whether viewed from the standpoint
of the employer or that of the employee, it is inequitable and un-
suited to the conditions of modern industry."
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The general theory upon which Workmen's Compensation Acts
rest is economically sound and the end secured is certainly socially
'Western Indemnity Co. v. Pillsbury (1915) 170 Cal. 686, 693; 151 Pac.
398, 401.
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desirable, and it is believed that the enactment of such a law in North
and South Carolina would be a step forward in each state's indus-
trial progress. Under a compensation system, employers not only
do not treat injured employees as antagonists asserting adverse
claims, but usually assist them in securing a prompt payment of
their claims by the insurance carrier. The laws of forty-three sister
states furnish convenient guides to the legislatures of North and
South Carolina. Is it too much to hope that they will profit by the
example?
